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1.1. Introduction
This volume contains summaries of the findings from the Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project's (LVFRP)
'4-beaches Survey', and its stakeholder workshops.
The 4-beaches survey is the first of its kind on Lake Victoria. Drawing oli Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)
techniques, four landing sites around the lake were selected for long-term monitoring from March 2000 through
to October 2001. The primary reason for the length of the study was that social institutions are dynamic, and in
order to understand this dynamism, the progress and evolution of institutions is best gleaned over the course of
time. Such institutions may either (a) form the backbone of regulatory institutions, or (b) be of use to the
management of the fishery. Theoretical literature on this subject (cf. Ostrom, 1990) insists that such institutions
take time to develop and are never static.
In late February and early March of 2001, the Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute, the Tanzania
Fisheries Research Institute and the Fisheries Resources Research Institute of Uganda, hosted a series of
stakeholder' workshops with support from the Lake Victoria Fisheries Research Project (LVFRP).
Representatives from a number of stakeholder groups gathered together in Jinja in Uganda, Kisuniu in Kenya
and Mwanza in Tanzania, to deliberate a series of questions designed by institute and Project staff prior to the
meetings. Between 75 and 110 'stakeholders' attended each of the workshops, and included representatives
from/for:
Fìsheries Departments.
Fishermen.
Fish traders and processors.
Women's groups.
Municipalities.
'Policy makers'.
Fisheries research institutes.
Industrial fish processing factories.
NOOs and CBOs.
Co-operative socìeties.
1.2. The 4-beaches Survey
1.2,1. Study objectives
The 4-beaches survey comprised a component of the LVFRP's Co-management Survey, which had, as its
specific objectives, the following:
To identifv the difficulties and impracticahities inherent ìn implementing state-based regulations via a
'top-down' management strategy.
To assess the prevaleice of community-based institutions that either seek to regulate the fishery or have
the potential to be used to regulate it;
(e) to identify ways in which community-based regulatory and monitory systems may be established, and
how these will fare over time;
2to identify roles for national Fisheries Departments, industrial fish processors and other 'stake holders'.
to develop well-founded policy suggestions for the establishment of a co-management framework to
manage the fisheries of Lake Victoria.
The 'four beaches' study was to be a long-term sub-component of the co-management study which aimed to
study four individual fishing communities in each of the riparian countries. Virtually nothing was known about
the use of community-generated regulatory institutions on Lake Victoria. The 'four beaches' study hoped that by
examining fishing communities over time, and the evolution and performance of their regulatory institutions,
some knowledge concerning this matter could be derived and which would contribute directly to the
development of a management plan for the lake's fisheries. It was with this objective in mind that the following
objectives were identified for the 4-beaches survey:
To identify community institutions which either sought to directly regulate access to, or ownership of,
fisheries resources; or those institutions which could be used for these purposes. Many community-based
institutions are subtle and may not be immediately obvious unless these communities are studied over
time.
To understand whether or not community-based institutìons were able to support externally introduced
regulations, such as state-sourced suggestions.
To seek to understand the kinds of benefits that communities required in order to adopt and/or develop
regulatory institutions. The pivotal component in small-scale regulatory institutions was typically based
on trade-offs between benefits to be gained against those lost when faced by some regulation. Many of
these may have been monetary. However, an equal number might have related to so-called 'social capital'.
Perceptions of these benefits and the regulations that they support needed to be understood if community-
based regulations were to form a component in a co-management framework for Lake Victoria's fisheries.
To understand what factors contributed to the survival of community-based institutions over time.
Finally, the 'four beaches' study sought to play an instrumental role in identifying how extension services
could be delivered to communities, the form these should take and the types of services that such
communities might require.
As such, the outputs of the four beaches study were expected to be as follows:
The identification of other community institutions which influenced access/ownership of fisheries
resources.
The identification of institutions which could be used for these purposes.
(e) An understanding of whether or not community-based institutions are able to support externally
introduced regulations.
An understanding the kinds of benefits that communities require in order to adopt and/or develop
regulatory institutions.
An understanding of the factors that contributed to the survival of community-based institutions over time.
The identification of how extension services could be delivered to fisheries-dependent communities.
The four beaches selected for the survey were Nkombe in Uganda, Obenge in Kenya, and Ihale and Mwasonge
in Tanzania (Figure 1).
1.2.2. The Nkombe PRAs
The Landing Management Committee (LMC) at Nkombe specifically understood its responsibilities to be the
resolution of conflict and to prevent the use of 'bad' fishing methods.
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Figure 1: location of landing sites featured in this study
(o) Every three families must join forces to build a pit latrine. This is because there is not enough land for
each family to have one. Hotel, bars and kiosk owners must construct their own pit latrines because they
attract many people.
Bathing and washing in the lake is forbidden.
Cultivation is not allowed within the vicinity of the landing to avoid conflict with those who keep
chickens, ducks, goats and cows, which have access to the water and the gazing around the landing.
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Nkombe stood apart from other landings in the 4-beaches survey because of the large number of byelaws it had:
Fishers are not allowed to speak obscene words at the landing. If caught, they may be imprisoned for a
week and fined Ushs. 10,000/-.
Fishers are not allowed to land any where apart from at the officia! landing site. If they are caught doing
so, they may be fined Ushs. 20,000/-.
A fisher must be above 8 years. Children under this age are not allowed to fish because then they get
used to money and do not go to school. During holidays, however, children of poor parents are allowed to
fish so that they can earn money to buy books, pencils and pens.
Fishers new to the landing must register with the beach leader ('Gabunga'), and present documents from
the landing fi-orn where they are coming. Forms are filled in triplicate and passport photos provided for
identification.
There is a boat guard on the beach who patrols. For every boat guarded, he gets Ushs. 100/- and a fish.
Boat owners may not quarrel about this fee. The boat guard, in turn, is fined for anything that may go
miss ing.
Theft of fishing gear is punishable by imprisonment.
Fish traders are not allowed to fight one another over fish supplies.
Fish landed must be weighed and sold by auction.
Traders must fill in forms in triplicate and have identity cards. The fish they buy is counted and inspected
by the landing management committee, so that anyone claiming that their fish has been stolen or
poisoned, it can be verified.
The Gabunga has rio powers to take someone to prison without first going through the Local Council
Comiri ittee.
The way in which these bylaws were arrived at, it was claimed, was via agreement by the whole community.
Recent visits revealed that the community had banned the use of 'boat seines'. Like at Obenge, where lupa lupa
and katuri techniques have been banned, the objection to this fishing technique appears to be that it gives users
an advantage over conventional gear users which is considered too great.
An interesting comment made during the final Nkornbe visit to FIRRI regarded 'sensitisation'. The community
argued that repeated exposure to arguments concerning the lake and bad fishing methods did yield positive
results on the ground. A one off visit by a Fisheries Officer, on the other hand, would be unlikely to yield any
positive results. Also at this meeting was the call that if communities were to be involved in the regulation of the
fishery, they would have to have legal backing.
The Gabunga receives no salary. He claims that the benefit he derives from his post is that if Nkombe's byelaws
work, then catches will improve and he, as a fisherman, will gain.
The number of organisations at Nkombe is of interest. Many of these are women's groups, and most are
involved in farming. The main tasks of these organisations seems to be the generation of a little income for their
members through the farming produce that they are able to sell. More ìmportantly, they are typically revolving
credit groups. These are important in the light of the temporary credit relief that they provide for rural women.
Why there should he so many of them. however, ìs perplexing, and there may be several reasons for this. A
possible one is concerns the amounts of money that each asks its members to pay on entrance and per
day/week/month. Women will join the group that bests suits their financial means. Another possible reason
concerns the resources available to the group concerned es out of what women are prepared and able to pay.
1.2.3. The Obenge PRAs
Besides the common complaint of theft, virtually all of Obenge's 'main problems' revolved around sources of
conflict and conflict itself. They worried about the failure to pay hotel bills, fighting on the beach, rule breaking
of various kinds and damaging other peoples' gear. Like many other small scale regulatory systems around the
world, the regulations at Obenge were designed to defuse and/or contro) conflict. Theirs were disincentives to
conflict - the threat of punishment being held up as a way of trying to prevent conflict. These were graduated,
and started at warnings and caning, and stretched through the referral to the Assistant Chief. Offences that
ranked as smaller misdenieanours, were punished at the landing site by landing site authorities. Fighting, for
Dexample, was dealt with by the Assistant Chief, women's group heads and/or the beach leader. As the
seriousness of the offence gained gravity, so too the number of external actors increased. At the other extreme,
theft and prostitution, for example. might attract the attention of Courts of Law. Indeed, as the gravity of the
offence increased, it was common that the number of actors who might hold responsibility for punishing the
offender increased. Hence, villagers at Obenge would gauge each and every case on its own individual merits
and then consider how seriously it should be punished and whether or not outsiders should be involved.
Prostitution attracted the most actors - six, while damaging nets attracted four, including two outsiders (the
Fisheries Department and the Courts).
As the report on the second PRA visit explained, with respect to fighting,
"the beach committee will those who were fighting, hear their reasons and then pass judgement. The
person who proved to be in the wrong will be given physical punishment or asked to do some manual
work, such as clearing the beach and cleaning it. If the case is too difficult for the committee to handle
alone, they may call the whole community which will together pass judgement by consensus. The fact that
the offender faces the whole community is embarrassment enough, especially to the relatives he respects,
like his mother-in-law" (Abila et al., 2000: 13-14).
Interestingly, the police were identified as option for punishing offenders, possibly because Obenge had already
had a bad experience with them during a theft case, when the culprit had been caught and handed over to the
police, only to be released again. The stolen nets, being held as 'evidence' were lost.
Of some importance is the punishment of banishment from the landing, one often called upon during the
stakeholders' workshops.
Obenge falls under the remit of the Misori Fishermen Co-operative Society (MFCS) located a short distance
away from the beach, Members from the beach have been making contribution to the MFCS, but the latter has
ceased to issue annual bonuses. The villagers feel that the only way that they will be able to deal with this
problem is if the co-operative was based at Obenge. Obenge's people have considered the possibility of
establishing their own co-operative, but worry that this will mean they will outright loose all of their
contributions to the MFCS, and that things due to them by the co-operative, such as engine boats, will not be
delivered.
The villagers discussed fisheries regulations. They claimed that they had a 'security committee' whose
responsibility it was to enforce fisheries regulations. When questioned about enforcement, villagers were fairly
vague. The five-inch minimum mesh-size requirement for gill-nets was upheld because of the size of fish
demanded by the market; beach seines at the landing were 'licensed' by the Fisheries Department, and
respondents were divided over whether or not they were damaging; a closed area was identified as a 'stony area
along the shoreline.. .for about 200 yards'. The respondents seemed vague about enforcement within this area,
conceding that there were those who set their nets in the area. Most excitement seemed to be generated by two
fishing techniques: tupa tupa and katuri. The ban on these techniques had been clearly announced to the landing
by the beach leader, and outsiders who had come and used the techniques at Obenge had '...been arrested,
warned and chased away'. Why these two techniques should be banned is not clear.
1.2.4. The Ihale PRAs
The administrative background against which activities occur at Ihale include the Village Government,
established during the 'Ujainaa' period. When Ihale was first visited, the Beach Management Unit (BMU) was
said to work 'hand in hand' with the village government. The former included amongst its responsibilities the
curbing of fish poisoning, the preservation of natural resources, supervision to ensure that only the
6'recommended gears' are used, and maintenance of hygiene at the landing. It generated income for itself my fees
imposed on visiting fishermen, and fines.
The establishment of the Ihale Beach BMU (in January, 2000) was, as far as the beach was concerned,
unsatisfactory. They claimed that it was too hurried and that they were still not entirely sure of their responsibilities
or powers. They also complained that they could see no real benefits to be derived by carrying out its duties
because they were not paid. This latter complaint was encountered repeatedly around Tanzania's lake shores. The
BMUs were involved in neither the design nor the implementation of fisheries regulations. Charging the BMUs
with enforcing these regulations therefore prompted the view that the BMUs were carrying out the government's
job. Seeing as this was the case, it was only logical that they should then be paid, particularly given the BMIU
members were likely to be ostracised by their own communities.
Irrespective of the apparent absence of tangible benefits for the committee, the BMIJ also complained about the
laws it was charged with enforcing. The five-inch minimum mesh-size, it argued, did not enable community
fishermen to capture fish smaller than those sought by the fish processing factories. This meant, they said, that
there was little fish left for the community, most of it going for export. Fish that had, very clearly, been caught in
mesh-sizes of less than five inches could, however, be observed on sale within the settlement. Certainly, many of
the fish accepted by the fish processing factories also appeared to be too small, and the committee itself admitted
that they sometimes received orders for perch captured in four-and-a-half inch nets. During one matrix exercise
that considered the benefits of various gear types, mesh sizes of less than 5 inches were listed as amongst the most
favourable. The fact, then, that the BMU at Ihale claimed that under-sized mesh sizes were not being used when
they so clearly were suggests that the Unit is uneasy with its responsibilities and fully cognisant that it may be
unable to enforce mesh size limitations. In any case, the BM1J argued, the Nile perch was so fecund, it made no
sense to worry about over-fishing.
At one visit, the BMTJ explained to the TAFIRI team that they found it very difficult to enforce government
regulations, and provided two main reasons. First, Fisheries Officer often settled matters with offenders through
corruption. This demoralised the BMU, because it was as if the Fisheries Department was doing one thing, and
they another. Second, relatives of BMU officials had illegal gear, it was difficult to enforce the laws and
regulations.
The assumption of enforcement responsibilities by the Ihale BMTJ committee was not, therefore, regarded as a
sufficiently magnanimous benefit that they should then wish to enforce the law for free, particularly when the
community viewed the regulations as inherently unfair. This difficulty was the reason for the eventual collapse and
demise of Ihale's BIv[LJ.
Before it collapsed, however, the BMU was able to forge an alliance with the Village Government. This was
important because the BMU had come under criticism that it was spying on fishermen, and representing the
interests of the Fisheries Department and not the community - precisely the difficulty described earlier. The
alliance, therefore, increased the legitimacy of the BMU and gave it considerably more power to wield within
Ihale. The alliance was also of benefit for the community. Soon after it was forged, the BMU set about building
a new road to the beach to encourage trucks from the fish processing factories to come. They were also able to
persuade a wealthy fish buyer to build a toilet and shower facility for the beach.
Like Nkombe, the number of women's groups at Ihale was large (six in all). These relate to one another in
business, sharing ideas and contributing to one another in case of problems and also for entertaining visitors. The
netball and football teams (both called 'Manchesta') of Ihale, were repeatedly identified as important organisations.
They ¿ccupied an ambiguous place on the institutional landscape of the village, and certainly appeared to be more
than merely sporting institutions. With so many of the beach's inhabitants involved in the teams, they represented a
point during which the entire community could converge upon itself, to create a focus moment during which
friendships could be reaffirmed, new ones created, discussion initiated and politics debated.
7It is quite possible that the Manchesta teams represented a forum for Ihale's residents to create the institutions that
served them. Certainly, the teams appeared to have greater relevance to the community than its own government
inspired institutions.
An additional institution, on which perhaps too little information was gained, was the very central role that the
school played in the lives of these villagers. Not only did it occupy a geographically prominent position in the
community, but also a similarly exalted position in the minds of many of the respondents encountered. The
teachers were highly respected members of Ihale, and there was a prevailing sense that the school represented a
path by which the community's children could not only learn about the ways of the world beyond the beach, but
also as a potential conduit out of ihale. From its doors, young men and women emerged adequately equipped to
deal with the challenges lying down the road towards Mwanza or eastwards towards the coast, to Dar es Salaam,
Tanga and Zanzibar.
Finally, in the timelines on the history of Ihale, respondents mentioned the establishment of their churches. Their
arrival was considered sufficiently important to merit comment alongside, for example, the establishment of the
school and the beach itself. This suggests that the PRA may have underestimated the importance of these
institutions in the lives of thale's inhabitants.
The reasons why the sporting teams, the school and the churches were not proffered by the community as examples
of their internal organisational and regulatory structure may lie in the very heavy presence of government organs
on the beach. With Village and Ward Executive Officers very much in evidence, along with numerous committees
charged with various governmental responsibilities, Ihale is a community in which the state permeates most levels
of its society. In this way, the residents of Ihale may feel that it is necessary to speak of these institutions as being
more important than any homegrown variety, and proclaim their success lest they be judged negatively.
Respondents at Ihale identified theft, fighting, bathing in the lake, lack of sanitatioii, drunkenness and the use of
under-sized meshes as offences at their landing. Punishments included whipping, fines, the return of stolen items,
jail or referral to the District Fisheries Officer. Drunkenness was also ail offence, punished by the sungsungu who
might have the drunkard caned and possibly fined if s/he had damaged anything. Jail, they said, was very rarely
resorted to as a punishment. Tile matrix developed on this subject indicated jail as a possible punishment, but its
relationship with the offences of fighting and theft was only very weakly weighted. Otherwise, punishment of
theft, fighting on the beach, bathing in tile lake and poor sanitation were fines and the return of stolen articles.
Responsibility for doling out these punishments lay mainly with the Beach Management Unit (BMU), the
sungusungu and the Village Executive Office. In many cases, responsibility for punishment overlapped between
these three institutions: theft and fighting were heavily weighted as the responsibility of all three.
1.2.5. The Mwasonge PRAs
Mwasonge's administration resembled that of Ihale, with a BMIU and a Village Government. Unlike Ihale's BMU,
which was held up as a model example of how BMTJs should be run, Mwasonge's had a rather more colourful
history. When the Fisheries Department arrived at the beach in 1999 to set up the BMU, it was well aware that
Mwasonge had one of Mwanza Region's worst records of fish poisoning. Nevertheless, the BMU committee
selected had amongst its members those that practised fish poisoning, and tile BMU worked to protect this
activity from interruption.
And continue without interruption it did, until the Fisheries Department intervened once again, and asked that
the BMU be reselected. The present BMU does not., allegedly, permit fish poisoning.
During the first PRA at Mwasonge, the BMTJ identified the following as its main responsibilities:
8To make sure the beach environment is clean.
To make sure the boats are seaworthy.
(e) To make sure all the boats are licensed.
To make sure all the fishers have a fishing license.
To make sure immigrant fishers report to them and the village cell leaders on their arrival with the letter
from the BMU at their beach or origin.
To make sure fish poisoning and other illegal fishing practises are abolished.
To make sure that undersized nets are not in use.
To make sure fish is being sold in specified places.
To make sure that all solid and degradable waste is properly disposed of at the landing,
To punish fisheries-related offenders.
Amongst the illegal gears identified were gill-nets with mesh-sizes below 5 inches. Mwasonge's experience with
dealing with this problem echoed that at Ihale: there was a time that they would confiscate the under-sized nets
and the fish caught in them, and send the offender to the District Fisheries Office. But then the offenders would
just get released and repeat his crime, and the BMU got very discouraged, and a conflict arose between them and
the Fisheries Department. Since then, the Fisheries Officer has explained why the offenders were released and
their relationship is now much better.
Respondents at the beach explained that fisheries-related offences would always first be investigated by the
BMU, If the Mwasonge BMU felt that the case was too difficult to handle, it would be referred to the Ward
BMU, and from there to the District Fisheries Officer (DFO). If the DFO could not deal with the offence, it was
passed on to the law courts for arbitration. If the BMU demanded rapid action, they could take the offender
directly to the police and the courts before ìnforming the DFO.
How cases were dealt with also depended on the nature of the offence and who was involved. For example,
when there were problems involving migrant fishers, the BMU often included the village government in their
censure. The village government would also be involved when fishing gear or boats are seized.
As with ihale, therefore, each individual case was examined and gauged depending on severity and who was
involved. The result of this assessment would determine the type of punishment and who would mete it out. The
flow diagram below (Figure 2) provides an indication of how Mwasonge's BMU divided responsibility for
sanctioning between various authorities depending on the type and gravity of the offence (derived from the Third
PM&E report).
Also in common with Ihale, Mwasonge's BMU was concerned that their activities might not be sustained in the
long run because of funding difficulties. They derived some funds from fines levied, and the village government
charged a Tshs. 100/- daily landing fee on ahi boats at the beach. This helped to fund some of their activities and
to pay the village chairman a bonus, because he did not receive a salaiy for his work. But the funds were lìmited
and variable, and presented the BMU with a major problem. At the same time, however, the Village Government
was collecting funds from the beach - every boat that landed had to pay Tshìs. 100/-. A cleaner, who tidied and
swept the beach, also received a fish from each boat. The BMU therefore held a meeting with the Village
Government to try and obtain the right to collect the Tshs. 100/- levy, but the Village Government refused. What
was agreed was that the BMU should assume responsibility for tidying the beach, and raise funds from a one fish
contribution from each boat per day. The BMU was pleased to accept this suggestion, given that fish are usually
worth more than Tshs. 100/-. The fishers who were not part of the BMU committee did not recognise themselves
as members of the BMU. Instead, the community saw the BMU as an independent body monitoring fisheries
activities on behalf of the government.
Under-sized mesh
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Gear theft
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Figure 2: Offences and punishing authorities at Mwasonge Beach
The TAFIRI team noted that there was some antagonism between the fishing community and the BMU. For
example, there were complaints that some people, like farmers and government leaders, could become members
of the BMU committee without having any relationship with the fishery. Fishers felt that they should be the key
people in the BMU.
The team also noted that the BMU committee members had no morale at all, and they felt that they were
inefficient and had lost hope. They worried about the magnitude of their responsibilities, whether or not they had
the capacity to deal with these, and whether or not the BMUs were sustainable on the long run. They did not
believe that they could manage the lake on their own without external financial and material support.
When Mwasonge was visited in January, 2001, the TAFIRI team discovered that the BMU had arranged itself
into five groups of 17 people, which carried out a series of monitoring activities on a rotating basis. Why they
should arrange themselves in this way is not clear.
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1.3. The Stakeholders' workshops
1.3.1. Stakeholders' workshop: summary of discussions
is fisheries management necessary for Lake Victoria? What are its benefits?
All three countries more or less unanimously agreed that uisheries management was necessary for the lake.
Their reasons for this were usually spearheaded by calls for 'sustainabilily' and followed by lists of benefits,
including incomes, nutrition, clean water, bio-diversily, employment etc. Additional reasons provided Jbr
managing the resource were that it was transboundary, and because it is a common property resource. In the
light of later discussion concerning the use of boundaries and access restrictions as management tools, on
interesting reason provided for why the lake should be managed was that fishermen coming from other lakes
brought with them bad fishing methods.
Who are the stakeholders in fisheries management?
In the main, the stakeholders ìdentfied by participants included those represented at the workshops (fishers,
small-scale fish processors and traders, industrial fish processors, municipalities, researchers, policy makers,
researchers, fisheries managers, chieft, co-operative societies and NGOs/CBOs). In addition, participants also
included beach-level service providers (such as boat builders and net makers), transporters and fish collectors,
various central and local government agencies and organs, development partners and consumers.
What should be managed in fisheries management?
When tackling this question, many of the stakeholder groups used this opportunity to call for 'law enforcement'
emphasising the government as a source of regulation, and not communities. Otherwise, the lists yieldedfairly
predictoble management areas: fish stocks, gear, fishers, fish traders and processors, landing sites, land-based
activities (e.g. deforestation, pollution) and wetland use.
What are the responsibilities of your group and those you have listed in fisheries management?
This question generated the largest amount of discussion and data of any of the questions posed. In order to try
and understand and compare the data, ii was divided up between countries, and then the responsibilities
attributed to various actors examined.
Fishers: by far the most common responsibility attributed to fishers was that they 'should follow the law'.
Participants were here concerned that fishers should use only net mesh-sizes permitted by law, that they should
only land mature fish, that prohibited gear and techniques should not be used, that data should be yielded data
to researchers, that offenders should be reported, and that handling and quality requirements be followed.
Other broad - and often ambiguous - responsibilities attributed to fishermen were that they should 'mobilise'
their communities, contribute lo 'development', be 'responsible', exploit the resource/environment 'sustciinably'
and 'promoting sanitation'.
Fish processing factories: again, responsibilities here Jòcussed on those that fish processing factories are, in
any case, supposed to follow by law or by market protocol. These include such things as buying only mature
fish, maintaining quality standards and hygiene, payment of taxes and the avoidance ofpollution. These concise
prescriptions are accompanied by a series of vague and non-specific responsibilities that include reporting
offenders, contributing to environmental conservation/restoration, contributing to 'development', financing
research and providing 'good 'prices.
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Fisheries departments, centraLgovernment and policy makers; the responsibilities collected under this set of
stake holders were dominated by those attributed to the fisheries departments, which were typically those
expected of' them in the region 's fisheries legislation (e.g. enforcement, apprehension and punishment of
offenders, extension roles, conducting frame surveys and other research, etc.). In addition, fisheries departments
were also called upon to assume the responsibilìties of 'sensitising' communities to the regulations,
developing/ideniing funds for fisheries management, 'mobilising' communities in management, providing an
'enabling' environment in which fisheries management can occur, coordinating their activities with other
institutions, various types of landing-site development, conflict resolution and data dissemination.
Small-scale fish processors and traders.' as was to be expected, responsibilities attributed to these stakeholders
were dominated by calls Jbr quality control and maintenance, and the 'correct' handling offish. Interestingly,
this group was also charged with afbrestation because oft/ic amount of fuel wood used in fish processing. The
latter prescrlption was also extended into other 'environmental' responsibilities that included the protection of
the lake shore and wetlands,
Researchers: needless to say, researchers were expected to research. They were also expected to disseminate
their fIndings to other stakeholders, and to provide various types of technical and managerial guidance.
C'BOs and NGOs: the responses provided by cBOs and NGOs in Tanzanìa heavily emphasised collaboration
and co-operation with the government, and portrayed themselves as playing a supportive and implementation
roles to government policy and initiative. In addition, this group was, throughout the region, called upon to
'mobilise' and 'sensitise' communities. They were also expected to provide funds for a host of local level
activities, including the construction of certain facilities (e.g. ice plants, roads, fish bandas etc.), training (e.g. in
business management, credit management and the like), and 'lobbying and advocacy' on behalf of communities.
Consumers: only Tanzanian and Kenyan stakeholders attributed responsibilities to consumers. Typically, these
comprised an obligation to buy legally sized and good quality ,fish. Also mentioned was the demand that
consumers oflèr good prices, that they should provide information to the government on quality requirements
and, intriguingly, that consumers should 'slop thinking of fish as food for only certain communities'.
Donors and development partners: predictably, most of these responsibilities concerned funding and the
provision of technical inputs to development and research. In Kenya, several infrastructural costs were
attributed to donors, including bandas, the provision of ice boxes and machines, and the construction of roads.
Local government/chiefs/municzaalities: this group was assigned the highest diversity of tasks out of ali the
stake holders considered. These included legal tasks and responsibilities, such as law enforcement and
implementation and the generation of byeiaws. In some cases, law enforcement extended lo the control offishing
activities, and also to the provision of security both on land and lake. Responsibilities also included various
environmental control and conservation activities, such as the prevention ofpollution and the protection offìsh
breeding areas. In Uganda, it was suggested that the responsibilities of this group include the co-ordination and
facilitation of 'awareness' pro grammes, and also the mobilisation of communities into 'viable' groups. In
Tanzania, municipalities already collect various revenues from fishing communities, and this responsibility was
therefore mentioned.
BM'Uî/other landing stakeholders groups.' included as 'other stakeholders' were those that made nets and
constructed boats, both of whom were attributed responsibilities of manufacturing their goods within legai
standards. Small-scale caterers were expected to observe hygiene standards. In Tanzania, BMU were supposed
to 'look out for illegal gear. In Kenya, a number of responsibilities were attributed to co-operatives, including
savings and credit facilities, marketing and promotion offish, and the maintenance of'fish quality particularly
through its careful handling. The welfare of fishermen was also considered a co-operative responsibility, as
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well as other sundry activities such as contributing to landing development, the promotion of legal fishing
practises and gear, explaining to fishermen their duties, and the promotion and maintenance of sanitation at
landing sites.
How should fisheries be managed (list a range of activities)? How can stakeholders co-operate together for the
management of the fisheries?
This question also generated a great deal of data, andfor clarity, responses are summarised by country,
In Tanzania, attention was paid to providing BMU with the legal authority to manage the lake and to prosecute
offenders. Much was said about collaboration between stakeholders, the need for co-operation between them,
the need to include all stakeholders in the planning and implementation process andan emphasis on bottom-up'
management strategies. Collaboration was even extended to research. In addition, it was suggested that legai
gear should be provided to fishing communities. As was the case amongst her neighbours, Tanzania 's
stakeholders also thought that information exchange was an important component of the managementprocess.
In Kenya, much mention was made regarding the provision of powers to fishing communities to regulate the
fishery Ai the same time, calls were made for the efficient implementation and enfhrcement of state regulations.
Of practical value were calls for the definition of stakeholders and their roles and the need for co-operation,
collaboration and co-ordination between them. These latter calls were extended to the regional level where
harmonised regulatory strategies were sought.
The suggestions made at the Ugandan stakeholders' workshop were very similar to those of Kenya. Additional
suggestions were that cost sharing was important between stakeholders, an emphasis on infbrmation sharing
and dissemination and, importantly, calls for attitudinal and behavioural changes.
What do you think are the costs of fisheries management and who do you think should pay for these?
It was common throughout the region to divide costs between the capital investments of fishermen and the costs
of fisheries administration and regulation. Typically, fishermen assumed responsibility for their own capital
costs. Responsibility/or regulatory and administrative costs generated a rather more diverse batch of responses.
In Tanzania, regulatory and administrative costs, along with research and certain infrastructural costs (e.g. the
construction of latrines) were all considered the responsibility of the government, possibly in conjunction with
donors. Fish processing plants were considered responsible for their own capital and running costs.
In Uganda, fishers assumed responsibility fbr some managerial costs, and believed that they contributed
towards these through their license payments. Itis noticeable that fishermen often argued that their costs should
not in any way be augmented, although stakeholders were often content to attribute additional costs to
government and donors.
In Kenya, a whole host of costs were identified, and, typically, stakeholders felt that the costs of fisheries
management should be borne by the state and donors. Only one suggestion was made that the costs of
management should be shared amongst all stakeholders.
What are fisheries offences? How should the offences you identi' be dealt with?
Part of the logic behind this question was that stakeholders should be given the opportunity to idenify qffences
that lay outside those acknowledged by the various national fisheries acts; and that stakeholders could use this
opportunities to assign various monitoring and regulatory roles amongst themselves. The results are varied.
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Predictably, stake holders in all three countries detailed various formal fisheries offences and their
understanding of the punishments associated with these. Of more interest were variations on the latter theme,
along with informal fisheries offences and punishment, which we consider below.
In Tanzania concerns were raised about a new fishing technique, which used a net that spanned the water
column from top to lakebed. Worries were also voiced about tampering with fish weighing scales, the collection
of snail shells with beach seines, drfl netting, pollution, deforestation, conflicts between small-scale and large-
scale fishers andfarming on the lakeshore. Tanzanian stakeholders calledfor the tougher enforcement offormal
law. They also attributed BMUs with the right to fine offenders (who tamper with weighing scales). Typically,
however, stakeholders were vague about who should be punishing what offences, and the groups involved were
usually the courts, the Fisheries Department, the government and village government.
The responses of Ugandan stakeholders were not dissimilar. Amongst their responses was a sense of knowing
which offences should be reported to which authorities. In one case, graduated punishments were offered, which
included the cancellation of licenses. Like Tanzanian stakeholders, concerns were voiced about pollution, and
also migration between landings sites which, in common with their other riparian colleagues, Ugandan
stakeholders are keen to see controlled There was also a sense that stakeholders agreed with the spirit offormal
regulations, and suggestions were made that, in order for these to be effective, it was necessary that punishments
be made considerably harsher than they were at present.
The sentiment that punishments for formal offences needed to be harsher was also present in Kenya.
Stakeholders here were also much concerned about piracy on the lake, theft of gear, trawling and pollution. It
was rare for Kenyan stakeholders to attribute the responsibility for punishing to landing communities, typically
calling upon the courts and/or the police to mete out punishment. Of some interest was the argument that illegal
fishing gear should not be stocked in shops, suggesting that some stakeholders felt that fishermen could not be
held responsible for using it.
Suggestions and responses prompted by the various qùestions, therefore, were fairly restrained and conservative.
This may well be because the various stakeholder groups presented their findings on large posters and were
reluctant to voice conflict, disagreement or assign responsibility via this medium. The comments sessions were,
therefore, of considerable interest, as were the thoughts of the intern present at two of the workshops. In the
section that follows, we consider some of these themes.
1.3.2. Themes from workshop discussions
The 'helpless' fisherman: a common theme in much discussion was the 'helpless' or 'ignorant fisherman'.
Fishermen argued that they could not really be held responsible for using illegal fishing gear or practicing illegal
fishing techniques because they were not always aware of these. Hence, responsibility for declining catches must
be squarely placed with the government because they do not curb the worst excesses of the fishermen:
"...fishermen are not always aware of the bad things they do, so they need sensitisation". Similarly, arguments
were made that if illegal nets are available, fishermen cannot be expected not to use them: "Having available
illegal nets is like putting a tree in Eden and expecting people not to eat from it".
Although stakeholders besides fishermen tended to disagree with this perspective, it is of deep concern that
fishermen should argue that they cannot be held accountable for negative catch trends on the lake.
Infrastructure at and/or to landing sites: this was an important theme at many of the meeting sites, and ranged
from worries about the absence of physical infrastructure (decent roads, fish receiving 'bandas'), health facilities
(particularly sanitary lavatories), and the absence of appropriate handling and other quality assurance techniques
at beaches. In part, these concerns are fuelled by a desire to prevent the closure of the fishery for
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quality and/or hygiene reasons, a common cause for closure in the past. Calls for roads to fish landing sites occir
because of a desire to attract markets, particularly refrigerated trucks from the fish processing factories.
Dual/over-lapping responsibilities: during the exercise on identifving roles for stakeholder groups, it beóame
clear that (a) stakeholders do not necessarily agree over who should be doing what in the management of the
lake. (b) In many cases, the roles attributed to various stakeholder groups lay well beyond the formal mandate
granted such stakeholders under the law. (c) In some cases, the exercise began to reflect political struggles
between municipal and/or district authorities and central government. In Uganda, these were hinted at between
district officials' rights to collect revenue at landings, at the expense of central Fisheries Department power and
influence. In Kenya, municipalities argued for greater roles in fisheries management because the Fisheries
Department could not be trusted to deliver effective fisheries management.
This discussion was of considerable interest because it reflected, on the one hand, power struggles between
formal state institutions who regard fisheries management not necessarily as an obligatioñ or a service delivered
to. stakeholders, but as a source of augmented influence and power. On the other hand, the ambiguities contained
in who should be doing what is of concern, and must necessarily weaken concerted and united action for the
sake of the fishery and its continued productivity.
Misspent earnings and fisheries management cost sharingj the fisherman was often portrayed - in both Kenya
and Tanzania - as unable to look after his money. ".. fishermen are rich by 8 or 9 in the morning, but poor by il
at night". In Kenya, one speaker argued that the inability of fishermen to retain their income was a reason for
why they used illegal gear: "fishers have two good days, drink heavily, and then do not catch anything for 15
days, forcing them to do illegal fishing to make any income". One speaker even argued that fishermen could not
be trusted to responsibly use loans. If they were granted these, 'they will just turn around and buy another wife'.
The reasons attributed to these attitudes were varied, and included the often long distances to banks which
hampered saving, and a lack of a 'saving culture' amongst fishermen. Discussions in Kenya argued that this
contributed to the lack of development at landing sites, the poverty of fishermen and their households, and the
uneven playing field that fishermen perceived when dealing with the fish processing factories. Of some
importance was the argument that the absence of a saving culture meant that fishermen were unable to make
contributions towards fisheries management at the local level.
The question of what fishermen actually use their money on remains something of an enigma. Certainly, the
types of services commonly observed at landing sites - small cafes, drinking dens and the presence of prostitutes
- provides some indication. At the same time, it is clear that earnings are not necessarily spent on the
improvement/creation of local infrastructure, fisheries management nor even households. Whatever the case,
spending priorities amongst fishing communities are cause for concern, mainly because they may not necessarily
extend to the funding of management. Although calls for the joint funding of fisheries management were
common, fishermen typically felt that their contributions should be limited only to the cost of physical inputs
and labour.
Ugandan stakeholders made several suggestions for how they could pay towards management, and in most
cases, believed that if they did pay, they should be allowed to determine how the money was used, and that the
money should be used at the beach level. In Kenya, the apparent reluctance of the fishermen's group to assume
any kind of financial responsibility towards the management of the fishery prompted some to comment that the
government was already strapped for cash, and it was unrealistic to expect them to pay for management. There
were calls for a change in attitude: "It is embarrassing that we should go to the government or the donors and ask
them to build a toilet on our beach". In some cases, participants argued that fishing communities should be
allowed to assume managerial responsibilities so as to minimise or reduce the costs of management.
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These latter discussions were, however, largely restricted to Kenya and Uganda. In Tanzania, the general attitude
was that the government should assume full responsibility for the costs of management.
The discussion concerning the costs of fisheries management extended to paying communities for whatever law
enforcement roles they play. In Uganda the discussion echoed the difficulties of the Tanzanian BMUs.
Participants argued that Local Enforcement Units cannot work against theft and violence on the lake because
they are not paid to do so. Again, the notion that this, and other regulatory activities, are the responsibility of the
state encourages the view that if beach-level authorities are to assume responsìbility for them, then they are, in
effect, doing the government's job and should therefore be paid. It is problematic that communities may not see
benefits to be gained from such activities.
A recurrent theme throughout the region was that fishermen shou Ici be compensated once they switch to legal
gear because of the intervening hardships they are likely to endure, or because their illegal gear was very
expensive (e.g. beach seines).
Security: Security is increasingly a problem on the lake with incidents of the theft of gear, engines and even
boats not unusual. This is an area which may weil prove too difficult for one agency to handle and should
therefore be treated as a 'pan' lake problem. Thus, a 'pan' lake solution would need to be found with an
integrative focus of fishermen, fisheries departments, processors, local government etc. to tackle this and other
problems of monitoring, control and surveillance.
Legalising community roles: in Uganda, an important point raised was that of assigning fishermen managerial
duties which might overlap with those of other authorities: "Fishermen cannot go all out: they get to a point and
then they have to stop and hand over to the police or the magistrates. Some fishermen have even beeii arrested
for doing the work of the police, so they fear to take these responsibilities." Others worried about how, in
fisheries management, the FD ìs the 'last power' (in the sense of having the final word). In Kenya, calls were
made för fishermen to attain legal responsibilities for regulation, which, they felt, would ensure that their
activities are co-ordinated, and that ail participants were disciplined. In Tanzania, one commentator claimed that
irrespective of what the Fisheries Department said at meetings such as this, they once again became
'commanders' as soon as they returned to the field.
The issue of legitimising communities' roles in fisheries management was extended to a discussion on new
fisheries legislation in Kenya. When the workshop was informed that new legislation had been designed and
been through a period of consultation, several respondents called foul over not knowing about this consultative
process: "The workshop should not be influenced by the paternalistic attitude of government officers. Officers
saying 'that one has been taken care of' are worrying. Who took care of it? Did they discuss it with me? If we
are now amending the fisheries act, and he doesn't know the situation along the lake, what act are we going to
get?".
In Tanzania, the issue of legalising community roles in management is particularly relevant. Here, Beach
Management Units (BMUs) have been established at landing sites which are expected implement and enforce
government regulations. It is argued that in this way the regulations will become legitimate in the eyes of the
community (see Hoza and Mahatane, 1998). Under this rationale, it follows that if communities see government
regulations as legitimate, they will therefore follow them.
The belief that small-scale communities cannot be trusted to design, implement and enforce their own
regulations was reiterated by the discussion in Tanzania. Fiere, the municipal group argued for 'bottom-up'
management approaches, and then assigned full managerial responsibilities to the state.
Formal regulation and punishment: the discussion above concerning the transfer of legally enshrined regulatory
responsibilities to fishing communities is, of necessity, linked to the right of communities to punish offenders.
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Claims to punishment rights were, however, muted. Participants did however, use the meeting as a platform to
criticise state regulation and enforcement. In Uganda, one group argued that present fines of Ushs. 5,000/- were
ridiculous because it could cost over Ushs. 3 0,000/- apprehending the offender. A popular suggestion throughout
the region was that offenders should be banned from the fishery,
In Kenya. suggestions were made that once illegal gear was seized, then it should be destroyed immediately so
as to ensure that it did not simply reappear on the landings as soon as a bribe was paid.
In Tanzania, the discussion prompted one facilitator to ask (rhetorically) whether or not there was any evidence
that fines and/or imprisonment had actually contributed to the regulation of the fishery - were the punishments
actually deterrents, and could any creative alternatives be identified? Another participant pointed out that even if
fishermen could not get hold of illegal nets from shops, they were still very capable of making their own.
Despite these thoughts, Tanzanian presentations often emphasised fines and imprisonment as punishment, with
responsibility for meting these out placed squarely with the state.
The role of fishing processing factories: in Uganda, participants argued that fish processing factories had to play
a role in regulating the size of fish landed. There were also calls for them to plough back some of their earnings
into - for example - beach side toilets and bandas. Kenyan processors retorted to similar calls that they already
paid large amounts in taxes.
In Kenya, many participants argued that the factories made too much money, and there was a sense that they felt
that factories did so by 'ripping off fishermen, Arguments made by processors that the business of fish
processing was based on a 'willing-seller, willing-buyer' principal were treated derisively.
There is little doubt that the state in all three countries obtains large revenues from fish processing factories.
Why these revenues do not translate into better fisheries management is cause for concern. The possibility that
such revenues can be chanLielled directly towards local fisheries management activities, rather than passing
through national exchequers, needs to be considered and investigated.
All additional concern was tile very limited enthusiasm of fish processing factories to be involved in fisheries
management. The failure of fish processing factory representatives to attend the meeting in Tanzania was
worrying. Because of their limited number and their central location, fish processing factories represent some of
the most easily monitored sections in the fish marketing chain, Iftlie factories are reluctant to contribute towards
fisheries management through - for example the volLmntary implementation of minimum slot sizes for fish, the
possibility that they should be forced to oblige through a combination of state monitoring and market controls
must be considered.
Fish stock data and research: discussion raised concerning research emphasised the need to know about fish
stocks and optimal rates of exploitation. Fish processing factory representatives argued that if they did not know
how much fish they could take, they could not really be expected to respond to vague calls for them to restrict
the amount of fish they processed.
A common call throughout the region was that stakeholders should be made party to research results. There is a
clear need to address problems in data and research dissemination, and consideration must be given to exploring
ways of relaying such information to stakehoider groups.
Territories. boundaries and access limitations: ìn Uganda, it was suggested that fishers should be prevented from
moving between lakes so as to engender a sense of responsibility for the lakes at which they are stationed. The
ability to move away from a fishery once it collapsed, participants argued, meant that fishermen did not develop
this sense of responsibility: "if he cannot move to another fishery, he will not destroy his own fishery".
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This perspective was echoed in Kenya, where one speaker argued that access should be restricted to only those
living along the lake shore. Those who came to the lake to fish from further afield could not be expected to
conserve the lake.
In Kenya, the argument concerning demarcation was heated. There were those who felt that provided a
fisherman obeyed the regulations, he should be free to go where he liked: "We have not come here to kill one
another the fish are not tamed, they move everywhere. If we cannot move around the lake, then we will start
killing one another". Others felt that 'in co-management, you need to know your area, where to start and where
to end".
Of considerable interest in the deliberations throughout the region was the fear of what was variously referred to
as zoning' or 'demarcation'. Stakeholders were worried that certain sections of the lake might be zoned off to
certain groups or individuals, impeding migration and the need to follow catches. In Tanzania, indeed, zoning
was specifically pointed out to be an offence, and much made of the right of all Tanzanians to use the lake and to
move around it freely. These kinds of concerns were made despite the acknowledgement that effort levels on the
lake are of considerable concern.
Identity: related to the creation of territories were ideas concerning identity. Many stakeholders believe that if
individuals and where they corne from is known, then some kind of control can be exercised over individuals.
Hence, when fishermen move from one landing to another, they have to declare their gear so that beach
authorities can be assured that no stolen item exists amongst it. Letters of introduction are often needed, and in
Uganda. boats must be painted in colours that denote the district from which they originate.
Fishers' organisations: the Ugandan fish processors made the suggestion that various stakeholders ought to have
representative organisations which they felt they would have an easier time dealing with. They indicated that
they would be willing to contribute funds towards the formation of such groups.
Other comment on fishermen's organisation was limited to complaints about the inefficiency and corruption of
fishermen's co-operative societies in Kenya.
Conflict areas: in Kenya, these occurred between fishers and factories, with the former arguing that they were
oppressed, and the latter arguing that their relationship was based on a 'willing-buyer, willing-seller' principal.
The intern also identified conflict between Kenyan fishers and officials in the realm of regulation. Officials
argued that fishermen should police themselves 'because it is the law1', while fishermen countered that the state
was corrupt and/or enforced the law patchily. Much was made of the lack of consultation with fishermen and
other stakeholder groups when the government formulated new laws. Also mentioned (above) was fishermen
seeking to implement regulatory regimes, only to find that the state regarded this as the usurpation of their
power. For other conflict areas in Kenya, see the interns notes in the relevant chapter.
In Tanzania, the conflict between small-scale fishers and 'prominent' fishers sponsored by fish processing
factories was acutely articulated. The women's group here said that these large fishing camps muscled in on
small-scale fishers and their fishing grounds, and that open conflict on the lake was common.
The latter argument is of some interest and also arose in Tanzania, where the Fisheries Department argued that because it
was illegal and enshrined in law, then beach seines could no longer be made. Within the region, the belief that the having a
rule enshrined in law will automatically result in its obedience at the local level, is a significant short-coming in much in the
implementation and enforcement of the region's fisheries regulations.
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L4. Report structure
This report is arranged as follows:
A methodological chapter summarising the research methods used during the 4-beaches survey and the
stakeholders' workshops.
Chapters two, three and four present country findings for the 4-beaches survey.
Chapters five, six and seven summarise country findings from each of the stakeholder meetings held in
Jinja, Bondo and Mwanza.
Chapter eight provides concluding commentary.
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